We systematically apply the principles of Cousot-Cousot-style abstract interpretation (a.i.) to the hierarchy of operational semantics de nitions| owchart, big-step, and small-step semantics. For each semantics format we examine the principles of safety and liveness interpretations, rst-order and second-order analyses, and termination properties. Application of a.i. to data-ow analysis, model checking, closure analysis, and concurrency theory are demonstrated. Our primary contributions are separating the concerns of safety, termination, and e ciency of representation and showing how a.i. principles apply uniformly to the various levels of the operational semantics hierarchy and their applications.
Introduction
Abstract interpretation (a.i.) is accepted as the correctness foundation for data-ow analysis of owchart programs 11, 12, 31] , and related research has demonstrated that a.i. can be applied to non owchart programs de ned by denotational semantics 1, 6, 15, 20, 31, 35, 42, 51, 45, 46, 47] and structural operational semantics 13, 24, 56, 57, 58, 59, 66] . Model checking is another important applications area 8, 17, 18, 63, 64] .
In this paper, we survey abstract interpretation in the hierarchy of operational semantics: owchart semantics, big-step (natural) semantics, and small-step semantics. We de ne it, explain how to do it, show how to terminate it, and apply it to data-ow analysis, model checking, and concurrency theory. We examine the distinctions between safety and liveness interpretations and rst-order and second-order analyses (collecting semantics), and we handle challenges that arise in the semantics forms: Big-step semantics cannot express divergence, so we employ coinductive de nition techniques in response; small-step semantics generate sequences of program con gurations that are unbounded in size, so we abstractly interpret source language syntax itself. The paper's technical concepts are taken from the trailblazing research of Cousot and Cousot 16, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15] ; our contribution is the expository and systematic use of these concepts in an important applications arena.
The structure of the paper goes as follows: Basic concepts appear in Section 1.1; Section 2 applies the concepts to a thorough development of abstract interpretation of owchart semantics. Sections 3 and 4 apply a.i. to big-step semantics and small-step semantics, respectively, addressing problems unique to these formats. Applications are intertwined with the semantic forms upon which they are based. Section 5 concludes.
What is Abstract Interpretation?
Given that the concrete interpretation (c.i. ) of a program is the execution trace of the program applied to run-time data, we say that the abstract interpretation (a.i. ) is the execution trace of the program applied to tokens that denote properties of the run-time data|an a.i. is a \symbolic execution" where the symbols have semantic content. An example is implementation of type inference by an a.i. where run-time data are replaced by datatype tokens, e.g., data like 2 and true are replaced by int and bool, respectively, and the program executes on datatype tokens.
When run-time data sets are replaced by tokens, the operations within the program must be revised to compute consistently on the tokens. In algebraic terminology, the program's owchart is a \signature"; when the owchart's boxes are instantiated with operations that compute on run-time data, one obtains a c.i. of the signature; when the boxes are instantiated with operations on tokens, one obtains an a.i. of the signature; and when there is a homomorphism from the c.i. into the a.i. , then the a.i. is a safe simulation of the c.i. (There also exist \live simulations," which are discussed later.) For example, the concrete semantics of the operation y:=x+1 is the usual assignment, and the abstract semantics is a type inference: y is assigned t, if x's value is t 2 fint; realg, else y is assigned > (error type).
A crucial issue is termination: although the c.i. of a program with its run-time data might terminate, the a.i. might not, because the tokens are less precise. For example, the abstract interpretation of a test, x>0, cannot be decided when the token value of x is int. This forces the a.i. to traverse both execution paths that emanate from the test, implying that loop paths can be traversed forever. Therefore, an a.i. must be coupled with a strategy for termination. The strategy must ensure a program's a.i. is a trace where every in nite path contains a node that is a repetition of one seen earlier in the path, that is, the trace is a regular tree. Techniques like memoization 58, 59] and widening 11] can ensure regular trees.
Once an a.i. is terminated, one must extract information from it and apply the information to validation or code improvement. The information extracted is the collecting semantics; both c.i. and a.i. possess collecting semantics, which can be rst-or secondorder 45] . A rst-order collecting semantics is a mapping from a program's program points ( owchart boxes) to the input domains of the program points. That is, the collecting semantics de nes the range of values that enter the program points. A second-order collecting semantics maps program points to the set of execution paths that lead into (or, dually, lead out from) the program points. An a.i. that is a safe simulation of a c.i. will produce a collecting semantics that is a superset of the homomorphic image of the one for the c.i.
The usual collecting semantics for a type inference is rst order, whereas the collecting semantics for an available-expressions analysis is (forwards) second-order, and a live-variable analysis produces a (backwards) second-order collecting semantics. There exist more general forms of collecting semantics 13], which are discussed later.
For e ciency, an implementation will build a compact representation of an a.i. 's execution trace or even bypass the trace and construct a representation of the collecting semantics directly|the cache computed by a ow analysis is a classical example 3]; the \cache" computed by denotational-semantics analysis is another 28].
We begin by developing these notions for the operational semantics of owchart languages.
Abstract Interpretation of Flowchart Programs
The principles of abstract interpretation were established for owchart programs by Cousot and Cousot 11] , and most of the material in this section is a review of their work. Precedents for the use of traces as seen in this section are found in 16, 32, 31] . Figure 1 shows a owchart program that uses a storage vector with a single variable, Perhaps better target code can be generated for commands whose inputs are always even numbers. This motivates an a.i. of the form displayed in Figure 2 . The Val set is abstracted to AbsVal = fe; og, denoting even and odd numbers, respectively, and each concrete transition is revised into one or more abstract transitions. The resulting abstract semantics must be nondeterministic in its interpretation of div2. This implies that the a.i. should be a set of traces, but we represent the set by a single, nondeterministic, trace tree. Thus, the program's a.i. contains more paths than what appear in the c.i. Also, the a.i. trace is in nite, but the in nite path contain a repetition node, meaning that the tree is regular and has the nite representation shown in the Figure|termination of the a.i. is not a problem here, because the set of commands and the AbsVal set are nite.
Relating Concrete to Abstract Traces
Intuition tells us that a homomorphism should relate the concrete transition relation in Figure 1 to the abstract one in Figure 2 . Let : Val ! AbsVal map concrete data to the abstract tokens that best represent them: e.g., (2n) = e and (2n + 1) = o, for n 0.
Expressed in terms of the transition relation, the homomorphism property reads: for all program points, pp, and c 2 Val, c`pp ! c 0`p p 0 implies there exists a 0 2 AbsVal such that (c)`pp ! a 0`p p 0 and (c 0 ) v a 0 The inequality, (c 0 ) v a 0 , is a weakening of the expected (c 0 ) = a 0 because an acceptable a.i. can lose precision. For example, we might code the div2 operation in Figure 2 so that it is deterministic: a`x := xdiv2 ! >`x := succ x, for all a 2 AbsVal The intent of safe Trace is that every computation path in t C is safely approximated by one in t A . The consequences of this property will be studied later.
A technical issue is that the de nition of safe Trace is recursive, and the largest such relation satisfying the recursion is desired. This motivates de nition and proof by coinduction, which is discussed in the next section.
We now reach the payo for the de nitions: for program p and input c 2 The relational homomophism property is easily proved equivalent to the homomorphism property given earlier.
From here on, we work entirely with the relational representations; alternative frameworks are discussed at length in 13]. Indeed, it is possible to begin the discussion of safety not with a map but with a relation, safe V al , provided that safe V al is U-closed: c safe V al a and a v a 0 imply c safe V al a 0 13, 43, 58]. 1 The de nitions for traceC(p0; c) and traceA(p0; a) are in Section 2.3.
Inductively and Coinductively De ned Sets
The owchart traces in the previous section can be in nite, and proofs on in nite traces are best worked with coinductive techniques 2, 54, 40], which we now review. The following presentation is summarized from Cousot and Cousot 14] .
We begin with the classical inductive de nition. Let U be a universe of terms, and let F: P(U) ! P(U) be continuous 2 to prove lfpF P, that is, every element of lfpF has property P, it su ces to nd a set S 0 P such that closed F S 0 . When F is de ned from a BNF rule, then proving closed F P is a structural induction proof.
When the above de nitions are dualized, we obtain coinduction: for U and F as above, the set de ned coinductively by F is gfpF = T i 0 T i , where T 0 = U and T i+1 = F(T i ). Also, gfpF = S fT 0 j dense F T 0 g, where dense F T 0 i T 0 F(T 0 ). That is, gfpF is the largest dense set. This gives the reasoning technique of xed point coinduction: to prove Q gfpF, it su ces to nd a set, Q 0 , such that Q Q 0 and dense F Q 0 . When a property, P, is de ned coinductively as P = gfpF, then proving dense F (gfpG) is a standard way of proving that coinductively de ned set gfpG has P.
Here are brief examples. Let U be a universe of strings of at most countably in nite (!-) length; the BNF rule, V ::= 0 j 1V generates the continuous functional V : P(U) ! P(U); V (S) = f0g f1s j s 2 Sg; we obtain lfp V = f1 n 0 j n 0g, whereas gfp V = lfp V f1 ! g. The proof proceeds as follows: First, note that safe Trace = gfpF(S) = f(t; t 0 ) j root(t) safe State root(t 0 ) and for all root(t) ?! t i ; there exists root(t 0 ) ?! t 0 j such that S(t i ; t 0 j )g. Let wft C and wft A denote the set of well-formed concrete and abstract traces respectively, and consider the set S 0 = f(t; t 0 ) j t 2 wft C ; t 0 2 wft A ; and root(t) safe State root(t 0 )g. We know that (trace(p 0 ; c 0 ); trace(p 0 ; a 0 )) 2 S 0 , so the result we desire will follow from the proof that S 0 F(S 0 ). This goes as follows: For (t; t 0 ) 2 S 0 , when root(t) ?! t i , where t i 2 wft C and root(t i ) = (c i`pi ), there must exist a transition root(t 0 ) ! a j`pi such that c i safe V al a j by the relational homomorphism property. Since t 0 2 wft A , a j`pi must be the root of some trace t 0 j 2 wft A , implying that root(t 0 ) ?! t 0 j . Finally, it is immediate that (t i ; t 0 j ) 2 S 0 .
A Comparison with Mathematical Induction
It is useful to consider how the above proof resembles a proof done by induction on the length of the trace. For simplicity, consider deterministic traces (sequences) only and an arbitrary safety relation, R . The claim that concrete trace t C = C 0 ! C 1 ! ! C i ! is simulated by abstract trace t A = A 0 ! A 1 ! ! A i ! is de ned as 8i 0; C i R A i ; the induction proof goes in two steps:
When the result is proved by coinduction, these two steps will reappear, but some startup machinery is required: The universally quanti ed safety property is recoded recursively as safe = gfpF, where F(S) = f(t; t 0 ) j head(t) R head(t 0 ) and (tail(t); tail(t 0 )) 2 Sg. The usual di culty in the coinductive proof is selecting the set to be proved dense for F, but a standard choice focusses upon the heads of the traces: S 0 = f(t; t 0 ) j head(t) R head(t 0 )g. First, we must show that (t C ; t A ) 2 S 0 ; this is the \basis step." Next, we must show that S 0 F(S 0 ); this is the \induction step," because it quickly decomposes to using head(t) R head(t 0 ) to prove head(tail(t)) R head(tail(t 0 )).
Although the above example was meant to emphasize the similarities between mathematical induction and coinduction proof techniques, one notes also that the primary distinction between the two techniques is that the former decomposes traces into their component states whereas the latter handles the traces as whole entities. As trace structures and their properties grow in complexity, it becomes more convenient to work with coinduction|safety properties stay simple and proofs stay short.
How to Derive the Abstract Semantics from the Concrete One
Once the abstract domain, AbsVal, is selected, we wish to derive the abstract semantics from the concrete one so that the relational homomorphism property holds. The above condition is su cient, but not necessary, for a relational homomorphism: If AbsVal is partially ordered, safe V al is U-closed, and c 0 safe V al uA, where A = fa 0 j c 0 safe V al a 0 g, then one obtains a better quality analysis by using a`pp ! uA`pp 0 . 4 
Liveness Abstract Interpretations
The examples so far are oriented towards safety analyses, where an a.i. contains more transitions in its trace than does the corresponding c. That is, the c.i. is a simulation of the a.i. . Figure 3 shows the concrete semantics of Figure 1 naively abstracted for a liveness analysis. Unfortunately, the reuse of AbsVal from Figure 2 produces an uninteresting liveness analysis that can analyze only one loop iteration|the problem is the abstract transition rule for x:=x div2, which cannot give a precise output. At best, a >-value can be used, and this leads to deadlock at the loop's test. Selecting the appropriate abstract domains for liveness analysis is a little-understood art.
To prove the liveness relation between the c.i. and the a.i. , the (dual of the) relational homomorphism property is required, and this can be obtained by deriving the abstract semantics from the concrete one as follows:
a`pp ! a 0`p p 0 only if for all c 2 Val; c live V al a implies c`pp ! c 0`p p 0 ; and c 0 live V al a 0
Termination of the Abstract Trace
The a.i. in Figure 2 is in nite, but its construction is nite because a state repeats in the in nite path; the trace is a regular tree and can be represented by a nite one with backwards arc(s). Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that every a.i. is a regular tree: for example, constant propagation analysis uses an in nite AbsVal set, and the a.i. proceeds just like its corresponding c.i. To terminate, constant propagation maintains a \memo table" or \cache" of program points and the inputs that arrive at those points. This concept is realized within a.i. as a memoization 58, 59] or widening 11] of the abstract trace. Figure 4 shows a constant propagation analysis with memoization. When a program point repeats in the trace, all previous inputs to the point are joined with the newest one, and the trace proceeds. This forces termination but with loss of precision. The memoized Figure 1 , coll t C (even x) = f3; 4g, and in Figure 2 , coll t A (even x) = fe; og.
The term \collecting semantics" has been used traditionally for the information taken from the c.i. , but it is equally applicable to an a.i. , and we see in Section 2.8 that an iterative data-ow analysis calculates exactly the collecting semantics of a memoized a.i. An a.i. 's collecting semantics is sometimes weakened by joining the abstract values for a program point: coll 0 t (pp) = tcoll t (pp), since in practice this is easier to calculate and often su ces for code improvement applications.
If the usual safety result has been proved, that is, the abstract semantics simulates the concrete semantics, then it follows that the collecting semantics for the a.i. safely approximates the collecting semantics of the corresponding c.i. , which is the \funda-mental theorem" of abstract interpretation: for program, p, if c safe V al a, then for all pp 2 ProgramPoint, coll trace(p 0 ;c) (pp) (coll trace(p 0 ;a) (pp));
where : P(AbsVal) ! P(Val) is de ned S = fc j exists a 2 S such that c safe V al ag.
A dual result holds for liveness analysis.
Perhaps more important but less well understood is second-order collecting semantics, which associates to each program point the set of paths that go into or that emanate from the program point; we de ne the forwards and backwards collecting semantics as follows: fcoll t (pp) = fp j p is a path in t from root(t) to some v`ppg bcoll t (pp) = fp j p is a maximal path in t such that root(p) = v`ppg Notable applications of second-order collecting semantics are available-expression and livevariable data-ow analyses, which are respectively forwards and backwards, but secondorder collecting semantics lie at the foundations of model-checking, as well; this application is examined below.
Finally, Cousot and Cousot 13] suggest that the collecting semantics of a trace can be any property or set of properties expressed in a logic, L. Given a trace, t, and proposition, 2 L, we write t j = if holds true of t. For the sake of discussion, we de ne the collecting semantics of t to be coll t = f j t j = g. As above, we wish to de ne collecting semantics of both a concrete and abstract interpretations, and we assume that the same L can be used for both concrete and abstract traces.
With this approach, we must rst prove a weak consistency relation between the safety relation, safe Trace , and L: t C safe Trace t A ) ( for all 2 L; j = t A ) j = t C )
That is, any property possesed by an abstract trace, t A , must also hold for a corresponding concrete trace, t C . This is the minimum needed to work con dently with L. Next, one might desire a weakly complete relationship: t C safe Trace t A i ( for all 2 L; j = t A ) j = t C ) To have weak completeness, there must be a close|or even exact|match between L and AbsVal.
The two above notions are titled \weak" because decidability is lacking: t C safe Trace t A and t A 6 j = does not imply t C j = : . If one replaces the rightmost ) in the de nitions above by i , one obtains strong consistency and strong completeness, respectively. The strong versions of the de nitions give decidability, but the price one pays is either an AbsVal set that di ers little from Val or a low-precision de nition of L.
These notions of soundness and completeness are developed by Dams in his thesis 17].
Representations of the Collecting Semantics
If the purpose for calculating an a.i. is to obtain an abstract collecting semantics for program points, then an implementation can generate the a.i. implicitly while calculating explicitly a representation of the collecting semantics. Typically, this is done by computing upon a set of equations or constraints that de nes the collecting semantics, one equation/constraint per program point; solution of the equations/constraints yields the collecting semantics. Examples of such representations of the collecting semantics are the table generated from solving a set of data ow equations (see the next section); the cache generated from solving a set of denotational semantics equations 28, 10] ; and the solution of a constraints set generated for type inference 4, 5, 67] or control-ow analysis 27, 52]. 5 Because of the emphasis placed upon the collecting semantics, it is all too easy to confuse an a.i. with the collecting semantics extracted from it. As a result, precision can be inadvertantly lost when an algorithm for calculating directly the collecting semantics is formulated before the a.i. upon which it is based. Also, safety proofs are complicated when they are worked on the collecting semantics algorithm rather than upon the a.i. .
Our recommendation is that an algorithm for calculating the collecting semantics should be de ned and proved safe with respect to the a.i. upon which it is based. The trace in Figure 2 can be model checked for simple path properties|for example, one can verify that all paths from the trace's root must include the command It is easy to prove that model checking upon a safe a.i. is (weakly) consistent when the 3 operator is removed from the calculus; call the result the box-mu-calculus. Dually, the diamond-mu-calculus can be used to model check a proved-live a.i. Here, the collecting semantics of a safe a.i. are those propositions in the box-mu-calculus that hold for the root of the trace. The collecting semantics is fundamentally second-order.
Finally, it is striking that second-order data-ow analyses can be encoded as propositions in the mu- which calculates the set of expressions that must be used at some point in the future from the entry to program point, pp. The ow equations are solved with a greatest xed point calculation: the initial approximation are sets of all the expressions in the program, and iteration of the equations on the initial approximation trims the sets down to size. The above ow equation format translates to a mu-calculus proposition that asks whether a speci c expression, e, is very busy at a state:
isV BE e = Z:IsUsed e _ (:IsModi ed e^2 Z)
Based on the local information, IsUsed e and IsModi ed e for each owchart box, the model checker attempts to validate the proposition for the nodes of the control ow graph|the model checker is the \engine" for calculating data ow. 7 Rather than working with the control ow graph, one can obtain higher precision model check by working with a less trivial a.i. of the owchart|the model checker calculates a second-order collecting semantics of the a.i. . Clarke 
Analysis of Big-Step Semantics
Flowchart models break down when higher-order procedural languages and other language paradigms arise, and we must rely upon more modern forms of operational semantics. We begin with big-step (natural) semantics 36, 51] , where a language's semantics is the set of derivations generated inductively from a set of inference rule schemes. Figure 7 gives the concrete semantics of an untyped, higher-order functional language where all user-de ned abstractions are recursive. 8 Primitive operations, op, are interpreted as functions, f opC , on Val. User-de ned abstractions are packaged into closures, which are interpreted upon invocation.
A natural semantics is attribute grammar-like, because its inherited attributes sit to the left of the turnstile in a sequent, and its synthesized attributes sit to the right of the down-pointing arrow. Figure 8 shows a c.i. of a convergent program that uses two primitive operations, even and div2, whose interpretations are given in the Figure. Figure 10 displays the a.i. of the example program. It is an in nite (but regular) derivation tree, which is problematic, because the standard, inductive interpretation of natural semantics prohibits in nite derivations|we must interpret the abstract semantics coinductively. Also, the synthesized attribute, a, for the repeated state, >`i f::: + a, is unresolved. The equality a = ota must be satis ed, which suggests that the approximation ordering on AbsVal be used to calculate the least such a that satis es the equation. More precisely, we desire the least derivation tree that satis es the regular tree schema. We tackle these issues in turn.
Safety Properties of Finite and In nite Derivations
For the moment, we backtrack and assume that both concrete and abstract semantics are de ned inductively. Thus, for a universe, U, of nitely-branching trees, the set of wellformed derivation trees derived from a set of inference rules, R, is the least set satisfying 9 This raises the issue of the approximation ordering on AbsVal. The de nitions of the four sets in Figure 9 are well founded, so the sets can be de ned as the smallest ones that satisfy the equations. The approximation ordering is de ned in the obvious way: AbsNat is de ned discretely; AbsVal is the (disjoint) union of its three components, where the orderings of the components are preserved, plus the extra element, >, such that a v >, for all a 2 AbsVal; the ordering on AbsEnv is pointwise; and AbsClos's ordering is de ned componentwise (Id and Expr are ordered discretely Figure 9 : Abstract big-step semantics the predicate wftree R U: wftree R (t) i there exists s 1 ; ; s n root(t) 2 R; n 0; and for all child subtrees, t i ; i 2 1 : : :n; of t; root(t i ) = s i and wftree R (t i ) For simplicity, R is a set of rules, rather than rule schemes.
As before, a safety relation must be de ned to relate the concrete and abstract intepretations, and we begin with the safety relation for the value sets, which is de ned for the example as The safety relation on sequents is C`e + c safe Seq A`e + a i C safe Env A and c safe V al a. As before, a c.i. , t C , is safely simulated by an a.i. , t A , if t C safe Tree t A holds, where safe Tree is the least relation such that t C safe Tree t A i root(t C ) safe Seq root(t A ) and for every child subtree t i of t A , there exists a child subtree t j of t A such that t i safe Tree t j . 10 The intuition is that every computation path in t C is safely approximated by some path in t A .
We desire the general result that for every source language program, p, concrete environ- 
In nite Abstract Derivations
We desire that every program with a c.i. also possess an a.i. , and Figure 10 makes clear that in nite abstract derivations are necessary. This implies that the abstract semantics rule set, A, de nes by coinduction wftree A , which includes in nite well-formed derivations.
Unfortunately, because of the synthesized attributes in the sequents, the coinductively dened set also includes multiple derivations for a program, p, and its initial A |an example appears in Figure 10 , where xing a = o yields a well-formed in nite derivation, as does setting a = >. For best precision one desires the least tree, which means one must partially order the set of derivation trees. 11 The in nite trees do not impact safety: although the predicate safe Tree is de ned coinductively, the safety proof proceeds again by induction on the height of the concrete tree, which remains nite. This works because any in nite paths in the abstract tree explore divergent computations that do not arise in the concrete tree.
In nite Concrete Derivations
An inductive de nition of the concrete semantics means that divergent programs cannot be studied. The obvious remedy is to use a coinductive interpretation, but the price one pays is f `e j + v j g j21::k?1 `e k *; for some k n `op(e i ) We would desire the least such tree, whose root is (apparently) C`l oop + ?, and indeed this approach can be formalized with the usual least xed-point theory 58]. But the nonleast trees remain and they complicate the safety proofs. For this reason, we pursue an approach suggested by P. Cousot based on G1-SOS 14] where there are two forms of inference rules, positive ones and negative ones: (i) the existing inference rules are the positive rules, and they generate nite, convergent derivation trees; (ii) new inference rules, the negative rules, are written speci cally for divergent computation and are interpreted coinductively.
To formalize this, say that a sequent, `e + v, for v 2 Val, is positive; next, introduce a new sequent form, `e *, representing divergence, and say that it is negative.
The concrete semantics has two rule sets: R + , the positive rules, which are inference rules of the form s 1 s n s 0 , where all sequents, s i , i 2 0::n, are positive; R ? , the negative rules, which are inference rules of the form s 1 s n s 0 , where s 0 is negative. For the example, the positive rules are exactly the ones in Figure 7 ; Figure 11 shows the negative rules. For example, the rst rule in Figure 11 states, if convergent derivations exist for arguments, e i , i 2 1::k ? 1, but e k is divergent, then so is op(e i ) i21::n .
The positive rules de ne the set of positive trees: wftree + C (t) i there exists s 1 ; ; s n root(t) 2 R + and for all child subtrees, t i ; i 2 1 : : :n; of t; root(t i ) = s i and wftree + C (t i ) Take the inductive interpretation of this predicate. Next, de ne the negative trees by wftree ? C (t) i there exists s 1 ; ; s n root(t) 2 R ? and for all child subtrees, t i ; i 2 1 : : :n; of t; root(t i ) = s i and (wftree + C (t i ) or wftree ? C (t i )) Take the coinductive interpretation of this predicate. The set of well-formed derivation trees is wftree C = wftree + C wftree ? C . It is trivially true that wftree + C \ wftree ? C = fg.
The safety proof requires an extension to the de nition of safe Seq :
( C`e + c) safe Seq ( A`e + a) i C safe Env A and c safe V alue a ( C`e *) safe Seq ( A`e + a) i C safe Env A
The de nition of safe Tree remains as before: safe Tree = gfp F, where F(S) = f(t C ; t A ) j root(t C ) safe Seq root(t A ) and for every child subtree t i of t C , there exists a child subtree t j of t A such that (t i ; t j ) 2 Sg. As before, the goal is that every concrete derivation starting from C ; e is safely approximated by every abstract derivation starting from A ; e. This follows from the proof that S 0 F(S 0 ), where S 0 = f(t; t 0 ) j t 2 wftree C ; t 0 2 wftree A ; root(t 0 ) = A`e + a; and ((root(t) = C`e + c; C safe Env A ; c safe V al a) or (root(t) = C`e *; C safe Env A ))g. The proof goes as follows: Consider a pair, (t; t 0 ) 2 S 0 ; If t 2 wftree + C , then we appeal to the earlier safety result for nite trees. If t 2 wftree ? C , then we must prove: (i) root(t) safe Seq root(t 0 )|since root(t) is a negative sequent, this is immediate from the denition of S 0 ; (ii) for every child subtree, t i of t, there is some child subtree, t j , of t 0 , such that (t i ; t 0 j ) 2 S 0 . This property must be veri ed explicitly by inspection of the inference rules used to derive t and t 0 , respectively; for our example language, we consider one example case: Say that the root of t is derived by this rule for divergent function application:
`e 1 + h 0 ; f 0 ; x 0 ; e 0 i `e 2 + v 0 0 ff 0 7 ! h 0 ; f 0 ; x 0 ; e 0 i; x 0 7 ! v 0 g`e 0 * `e 1 e 2 * . Consider subtree, t 1 , whose root is C`e1 + h 0 C ; f 0 ; x 0 ; e 0 i. This is a positive sequent, so we appeal to the safety result for nite concrete trees to verify that t 0 1 must be a subtree whose root is A`e1 + h 0 A ; f 0 ; x 0 ; e 0 i, where 0 C safe Env 0 A . Hence, (t 1 ; t 0 1 ) 2 S 0 . Similarly, root(t 2 ) = C`e2 + c 0 , a nite tree, implying that root(t 0 2 ) = A`e2 + a 0 , c 0 safe V al a 0 , and therefore (t 2 ; t 0 2 ) 2 S 0 . Finally, for root(t 3 ) = 0 C ff 0 7 ! h 0 C ; f 0 ; x 0 ; e 0 i; x 0 7 ! c 0 g`e 0 *, we deduce from our knowledge about root(t 0 1 ) and root(t 0 2 ) that root(t 0 3 ) = 0 A ff 0 7 ! h 0 A ; f 0 ; x 0 ; e 0 i; x 0 7 ! a 0 g`e 0 + a, for some a 2 AbsVal. This implies (t 3 ; t 0 3 ) 2 S 0 .
It is crucial to the simplicity of the proof that the negative sequents free us from reasoning about abstract synthesized attributes, e.g., a in the very last case above (cf. 58]).
Termination
We require that an a.i. terminate, and memoization can be utilized when the AbsVal set is in nite. Memoization proceeds as in the case of the owcharts seen in Section 2.6: an a.i.
is generated in stages, starting from a root sequent, t 0 = A`p + ?. (The ? means that the synthesized attribute is unknown.) At stage i + 1, each leaf in t i are expanded by an inference rule; if `e + ? is a newly generated leaf, the leaf is revised to t 0`e + ?, where 0 = tf 00 j 00`e + a appears in t i g. 12 This gives t i+1 . The completed tree is lim i 0 t i .
Memoization guarantees production of a regular tree when the AbsVal set is partially ordered and has the nite-chain property. This follows because a natural semantics is semicompositional, 13 that is, all syntax phrases that appear within the a.i. are subphrases of the original source program, thus there are a nite number of them. 14 3.5 Application: Set-Based Analyses The >-value and the t-operation that appear in the abstract semantics destroy precision; we prefer to say f div2A (e) equals fe; og rather than >. Worse still, the even-odd analysis of the program (if even(m div2) (rec f x.0) (rec g y.1))n joins the closures for rec f x.0 and rec g y.1, producing >, for which there is no inference rule for function application. An arti cial rule for function application can be invented, but it is worthwhile to investigate set-based analyses instead 27, 34] .
When working with sets, the abstract semantics rules use synthesized attributes of the form P(AbsVal); three of the modi ed rules from Figure 9 are f `e i + S i g i21::n `op(e i ) i21::n + ff opA (a i ) i21::n j a i 2 S i ; i 2 1::ng `e 1 + S 1 `e 2 + S 2 f i + (f i 7 ! cl i ) + (x i 7 ! v j )`e i + S ij j cl i = h i ; f i ; x i ; e i i 2 S 1 ; v j 2 S 2 g `e 1 e 2 + fS ij j cl i 2 S 1 ; v j 2 S 2 g `e 1 + S 1 f `e i + S i j (tt 2 S 1 ) i = 2); ( 2 S 1 ) i = 3)g `if e1 e2 e3 + fS i j (tt 2 S 1 ) i = 2); ( 2 S 1 ) i = 3)g For example, the rst rule states that the evaluation of each argument, e i , yields a set of values, S i ; the result of op(e i ) must therefore be the set of all f A (a i ) i21::n , for all combinations of a i 2 S i , i 2 1::n.
The a.i. of the example in Figure 10 is reworked in Figure 12 ; the precision of the trace increases yet safety is preserved. Notice also that the recursion, a = fog a, can be solved in the complete lattice P(AbsVal) (the computational ordering), giving a = fog|there is no need for > and no need for an approximation ordering upon AbsVal.
When sets of closures appear in an a.i. , the analysis is called a closure analysis 29, 30, 50, 53, 60, 61] . The complexity of a closure analysis is high, and a major challenge is nding e cient, safe simulations. The set AbsClos n limits the depth to n of the closures that can be produced by the analysis, ensuring that the AbsVal set is nite. Surprisingly useful analyses can be performed for n = 0 60, 61], but a complication to limiting the depth of closures is that a function application might be forced to synthesize an environment for the closure`7 ! f g when the closure is applied to an argument. (Indeed, this is always the case for 0-CFA.) There are a variety of safe methods for synthesizing the environment|a natural one examines the derivation tree for sequents of the form 0``: rec f x:e + f`7 ! f gg and joins the respective 0 s, thus (safely) confusing the creation sites (cf. \call sites" 62]) of the closure.
4 Small-step semantics Flowchart semantics is an example of a small-step semantics, so called because it rewrites a program con guration, step by step, to a nal or normal form. Here, we examine the e ::= 0 j :e j e 1 :P jj P jj P :P jj :P jj P jj P :P jj P jj P P jj P jj P :P jj :P jj P P jj P As an example, Figure 13 shows a CCS-like notation 41] with a small-step semantics that spawns processes via unfolding of a recursion constructor, . 15 Because the -rule generates new program syntax, the semantics derivations will not be semicompositional. Figure 14 displays a simple example that shows how the operational semantics of the program x:( :( :x jj x)) generates new processes, that is, new program syntax. All paths in the behavior tree are in nite, and the newly generated processes make impossible a regular tree representation. To undertake a terminating abstract interpretation, some means must be found to limit the dynamically generated processes.
Since there are no semantic value sets in the example to be abstractly interpreted, an a.i. must abstract the source program syntax itself. To set the stage, we note that every program con guration has an isomorphic representation as a bag of processes, called a \process pool " 48, 49] . For example, the con guration :P jj :P jj P is written as the bag f :P; :P; Pg. 15 The rule for in the gure unfolds a -process exactly once when it makes a communication step. This di ers from the rule often used: p(e)=p]e ! e 0 p(e) ! e 0 , which operates on closed terms only but allows unbounded unfolding. Nonetheless, the rules generate bisimular behavior trees.
:P jj P P ( :P ) + jj P ( :P ) + jj P + ( :P ) + jj P + ( :P ) + jj P + P + ( :P ) + jj P + ( :P ) + jj P Let P = x( :( :x jj x)) in :P jj P + ( :P ) + jj P + ( :P ) + jj P + P + Figure 15 : Abstract interpretation of process creation Next, as is common to abstract-interpretation applications, assume that the subphrases of the source program are indexed by \labels,"`i, e.g., P =`0: x (`1: :`2: (`3: :`4: x jj`5: x)) This means a process pool is just a function of the form Label ! Nat, e.g., the bag above is encoded by the function `3 7 ! 2] `0 7 ! 1]( `:0): 16 Our task is to abstractly represent the process pools, which we do by de ning the abstract pools to be functions of the form Label ! f0; 1; !g. Both domain and codomain of this function space are nite, so there exist a nite number of abstract pools. The example above is abstracted by `3 7 ! !] `0 7 ! 1]( `:0), and the safety relation between concrete and abstract process pools is of course: for cp 2 Pool, ap 2 AbsPool, cp safe Pool ap i for all`2 Label; cp(`) ap (`) Note that parallel composition, cp 1 jj cp 2 , is bag union and its abstraction is just ap 1 ]ap 2 = `:ap 1 (`) ap 2 (`), where 1 1 = !, and m n = maxfm; ng otherwise. Figure 15 shows the abstract interpretation of the derivation in Figure 14 . For simplicity, an abstract pool is written as a regular expression, where a \+" marks a process whose count is !. Using this representation of the abstract pools, we see that the semantics rules in Figure 13 can be used as the abstract semantics rules along with one new rule which accounts for processes whose count is !:
e ! e 0 e + ! e + jj e 0
Since there are a nite number of abstract pools, that is, syntax con gurations, the a.i. must be a regular tree.
Of course, the purpose of abstractly interpreting the syntax is to restore a form of semicompositionality. The regular expressions used here were rst devised by Codish, Falaschi and Marriott as \*-abstractions" 9]. In general, one might need a context-free grammar representation of syntax con gurations to recover semicompositionality; the precedent here is due to Giannotti For the example in this section, a liveness a.i. requires a di erent semantics than the safety a.i. : an abstract pool must be a mapping in Label ! f0; 1; : : :; ng, for some xed positive n. For example, for n = 2, the abstract pool representation of :0 jj :0 jj :0 jj :0 is ( :0) 2 jj :0.
The relation between concrete pools and the new abstract pools is cp live Pool ap i for all`2 Label; cp(`) ap(`) and the abstract semantics rules are the concrete rules along with e ! e 0 e n ! e n?1 jj e 0 for n > 0; where e 1 e and e 0 0
Recall that a live a.i. can be model checked consistently with the diamond-mu-calculus.
As noted by Dams 17] , ideally the abstract pools for safety and liveness analyses should be the same, because this lets one model check the full -calculus.
Application: Abstraction on Syntax and Semantics
Now that abstraction of syntax is understood, we consider a full-blown example, where we must abstract upon both program syntax and input data. Our example is CCS with value passing, where the values are channel names. The syntax is altered to read e ::= 0 j ?x:e j ! 0 :e j e 1 where represents an internal step, a \tau move."
This semantics de nes argument transmission via substitution, but substitutions generate new program syntax, which hampers an abstract interpretation. For this reason, we revise the semantics into an environment semantics: each process, e, owns a local environment, , that holds bindings of identi ers to channels, and we write a process con guration as `e. Although it is not essential, we eliminate the substitution semantics for p(e) by saving a \closure" of p(e) in the environment of the unfolded process, e. Figure 16 shows the modi cations.
To simplify matters, we assume that argument identi ers are distinct from process indenti ers; also, assume that each recursive process, p(e), uses a unique process identi er, p. Environments hold bindings of argument identi ers to channels, x i = i , and bindings of process identi ers to \closures," p j 7 ! j .
The computation rules are kept simple by employing the usual symmetric, monoidal congruences plus three more: the rst additional congruence explains how an environment is copied to component processes of a system; the second shows how identi er lookup in the environment is employed; and the third describes recursive process unfolding. The computation rules are as expected; the only novel rule is the one for recursive processes:
it creates a closure, p 7 ! , when the recursively de ned process, ` p(e), is evaluated. Figure 17 displays an example c.i. Now, a program's process pool representation is a bag of (environment,process) pairs. Assuming that processes are labelled, a process pool is concisely depicted as a function of form Label ! Bag(Environment), where Environment = (ArgumentId ! Channel) (ProcessId ! Environment). 17 A manageable abstract semantics de nes an abstract pool to be a function of the form Label ! AbsEnv f0; 1; !g, where AbsEnv = (ArgumentId ! P(Channel)) (ProcessId ! AbsEnv). That is, an abstract environment associates an argument identi er with a set of possible channels that the identi er might denote.
The safety relation between concrete and abstract process pools becomes cp safe Pool ap i for all`2 Label; jcp(`)j ap(`) # 2 and for all 2 cp(`); safe Env ap(`) # 1 where concrete and abstract environments are related as follows:
(fx i = i g; fp j 7 ! j g) safe Env (fx i = S i g; fp j 7 ! 0 j g) i (i) for all x i ; i 2 S i ; and (ii) for all p j ; j safe Env 0 j Based on the above de nitions, it is easy to see, for example, that for concrete pool fx = g`x!x:0 jj fx = g`x!x:0 jj ;` ?y:0 the abstract pool that best describes it is fx = f ; gg`(x!x:0) + jj ;` ?y:0.
As in the previous section, a new computation rule is needed for the abstract pools:
`e ! 0`e0 `e + ! `e + jj 0`e0
The abstract semantics rules are complicated by the sets of channels: If we use the congruence rule in Figure 16 to de ne substitution in the abstract semantics, then a set of channels is substituted for a channel identi er, e.g., fx = f ; gg`x!x:0 fx = f ; ggf ; g!f ; g:0. This implies that we should use the following safe, simple, but inexact abstract rules for communication:
`S?x:e ?S 0 ! fx = S 0 g`e for 2 S `S!S 0 :e !S 0 ! `e for 2 S The entire set of channels, S 0 , is transmitted along any 2 S. This is a form of \independent attribute" analysis of channel ow 33].
In contrast, a \relational analysis" would keep distinct the channels in S; we can formalize this idea with the following congruence rule: (x = S) 2 `g:e X 2S `( =x]g):e
The substitution of the elements of a set, S, into g:e generates not one but a set of new abstract processes to choose from. For example, fx = f ; gg`x!x:0 (fx = f ; gg` ! :0) + (fx = f ; gg` ! :0). 18 But more importantly, we have, if (x = S) 2 , then `(g:e) + is bisimilar to jj 2S `(( =x]g):e) + . This result ensures that a process con guration can be understood still as a process pool. Of course, the price paid for the extra precision of the relational analysis is a slower convergence of construction of the regular tree. Figure 18 shows the regular tree that results from the relational analysis of the program in Figure 17 . The interesting stages in the analysis are lettered (a)-(f). The transition into node (a), that is, the transmission of ! , generates the con guration `x!x:0 jj `x!x:0 jj `p, which has as its abstract representation node (a). The equivalence for process identi er lookup gives node (b); and the equivalence for argument identi er lookup gives (c), which is parenthesized to emphasize that node (c) is not actually generated|the analysis does not generate new source program syntax. (As just stated, f ; g`( x!x:0) + is bisimilar to f ; g`( ! :0) + jj f ; g`( ! :0) + .) The next transition, caused by ! , generates node (d), which is a syntax con guration that appeared earlier at (a); so, node (e) is a result of the memoization process, which joins the respective environments of (a) and (d). The substitution for p uncovers node (f), which is a repetition of (b).
Conclusion
The examples in this paper demonstrate that the principles of abstract interpretation apply simply and uniformly to the members of the operational semantics hierarchy. In particular, the trace-based representations of concrete and abstract interpretations make clear that not only does a.i. apply uniformly across the hierarchy but there exist close connections between a.i. and methodologies for ow analysis, liveness validation, and model checking. Unifying these areas within a general framework must be the next challenge.
